Using quantitative disease dynamics as a tool for guiding response to avian influenza in poultry in the United States of America  by Pepin, K.M. et al.
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 113 (2014) 376–397
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Preventive  Veterinary  Medicine
j ourna l ho me  pa g e: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /prevetmed
Review
Using  quantitative  disease  dynamics  as  a  tool  for  guiding
response  to  avian  inﬂuenza  in  poultry  in  the
United  States  of  America
K.M.  Pepina,b,∗,1,  E.  Spackmanc, J.D.  Brownd, K.L.  Pabiloniae, L.P.  Garber f,
J.T. Weaver f, D.A.  Kennedyb,g, K.A.  Patykf, K.P.  Huyvaerth,  R.S.  Miller f,
A.B. Franklin i, K.  Pederseni,  T.L.  Bogichb,j, P.  Rohanib,k, S.A.  Shriner i,
C.T.  Webba,b,  S.  Rileyb,l,∗∗
a Department of Biology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA
b Fogarty International Center, National Institute of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA
c Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory, Agricultural Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Athens, GA, USA
d Department of Population Health, College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA
e Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Pathology, College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State
University,  Fort Collins, CO, USA
f Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health, Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States
Department  of Agriculture, Fort Collins, CO, USA
g Center for Infectious Disease Dynamics, Department of Biology, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA
h Warner College of Natural Resources, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA
i National Wildlife Research Center, Wildlife Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of
Agriculture, Fort Collins, CO, USA
j Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
k Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Center for the Study of Complex Systems, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI,  USA
l MRC Centre for Outbreak Analysis and Disease Modelling, Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, School of Public Health,
Imperial College London, Norfolk Place, London, UK
a  r  t i  c  l  e  i  n  f  o a  b  s  t  r  a  c  tArticle history: Wild  birds  are  the  primary  source  of genetic  diversity  for inﬂuenza  A  viruses  that  eventually
Received 18 July 2013
Received  in revised form
22 November 2013
Accepted  24 November 2013
emerge  in poultry  and  humans.  Much  progress  has  been  made  in  the  descriptive  ecology
of  avian  inﬂuenza  viruses  (AIVs),  but contributions  are  less  evident  from  quantitative  stud-
ies (e.g.,  those  including  disease  dynamic  models).  Transmission  between  host species,
individuals  and ﬂocks  has  not  been  measured  with sufﬁcient  accuracy  to allow  robust
quantitative  evaluation  of alternate  control  protocols.  We  focused  on  the United  States
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of  America  (USA)  as a case  study  for determining  the  state  of  our quantitative  knowledge  of
potential  AIV  emergence  processes  from  wild  hosts  to poultry.  We  identiﬁed  priorities  for
quantitative  research  that  would  build  on existing  tools  for responding  to AIV  in  poultry
and  concluded  that  the  following  knowledge  gaps  can  be  addressed  with  current  empir-
ical  data:  (1)  quantiﬁcation  of  the  spatio-temporal  relationships  between  AIV  prevalence
in  wild  hosts  and poultry  populations,  (2)  understanding  how  the structure  of  different
poultry  sectors  impacts  within-ﬂock  transmission,  (3) determining  mechanisms  and  rates
of  between-farm  spread,  and  (4)  validating  current  policy-decision  tools  with  data.  The
modeling  studies  we  recommend  will improve  our mechanistic  understanding  of  potential
AIV  transmission  patterns  in  USA poultry,  leading  to improved  measures  of  accuracy  and
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. Introduction
Emergence of avian inﬂuenza viruses (AIVs) in poul-
ry  remains a global problem that can cost hundreds of
illions  of US dollars (Halvorson, 2009; Lupiani and Reddy,
009).  In the USA, even low-pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
iruses (LPAIVs) can cost millions of dollars to control
nce detected in commercial poultry (Davison et al., 1999;
alvorson, 2009). Major goals of the USA national plan (For-
ign  Animal Diseases Preparedness and Response Plan) for
inimizing  losses due to AIVs are: (1) to prevent the intro-
uction  of AIVs into poultry, (2) to identify infected ﬂocks as
uickly  as possible, and (3) to eliminate the virus as quickly
s  possible once it is detected (USDA, 2012). These goals are
chieved  through biosecurity (management procedures
hat minimize introduction or dissemination of infectious
iseases), diagnostics and surveillance (detection of AIVs),
epopulation and controlled slaughter, education of ﬂock
wners/workers and public outreach, all of which occur in
 planned, coordinated manner (USDA, 2012).
In developing and implementing speciﬁc prevention
nd response activities, multiple biological, political and
conomic factors are considered, such as virus pathotype
either highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus: HPAIV, or
PAIV),  the poultry commodity or commodities affected,
he  type of operation (i.e., commercial, backyard or live-
ird  market), the density of poultry in a geographic area, the
emands  of export markets, federal versus state regulatory
uthority, availability of ﬁnancial compensation, public
erception and potential for zoonotic transmission of the
irus.  Thus, the numerous response activities that occur
epend on scenario-speciﬁc circumstances. The success of
ny  strategy is dependent on trust, co-operation and inter-
ction  between industry and government (Swayne and
key,  2005). Consequently, it can be challenging to assimi-
ate  all of the necessary information during an emergency.
ound quantitative tools are essential for preparedness and
esponse  planning.
Preparedness and response modeling are two  com-
lementary quantitative approaches for informing policy-
ased  decisions made during an AIV event. During
reparedness modeling, there is more time for model
ormulation, evaluation and “situational analysis”, but
ppropriate data from previous outbreaks may  be unavail-
ble  or irrelevant. In response modeling, appropriate
uantitative data are likely being collected and analyzedn  evaluating  alternative  control  strategies.
thors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. 
as  the outbreak unfolds, but time for detailed evaluation
of quantitative methods is very limited. Because pre-
paredness and response modeling involve similar methods
and  data, preparedness modeling can and does facilitate
response modeling. The development, detailed inves-
tigation, and validation of several sound quantitative
approaches prior to an event are important for performing
response analyses with high conﬁdence in a short period
of  time.
Disease-dynamic models are useful for informing con-
trol  policies (Anderson and May, 1992) because they
incorporate a quantitative description of how transmis-
sion changes during the course of an epidemic (Fig. 1).
Adding additional components, such as age-structure or
life-history stage, to simple disease-stage models (i.e.,
models with different disease states such as susceptible,
infectious or recovered; Fig. 1) allows determination of how
alternative  control strategies, implemented at different
stages of the transmission process, will impact epidemic
dynamics. Disease-dynamic models are characterized by
the  presence of a force of infection (rate at which a suscepti-
ble  individual acquires disease) term that deﬁnes precisely
how  the infection hazard experienced by a susceptible
individual (or farm) depends on the current number of
infectious individuals (or farms), their proximity and their
type.  A key parameter that can usually be derived using the
force  if infection term is the basic reproductive number,
R0, deﬁned as the expected number of secondary infec-
tions generated by one infectious individual (or farm) in
an  otherwise susceptible population. R0 is used to assess
the  required proportion of a population that must be ren-
dered  non-transmissible for an outbreak to be controlled
(Heesterbeek and Roberts, 2007) and is predictive of the
impact  of interventions in reducing the attack rate, even
when  full control is not achieved (Wu et al., 2006). Some-
times, models are too complex in their assumptions about
the  population or the pathogen for the derivation of R0 to
be  tractable (e.g., individual-based spatial simulations).
Below, we outline some of the key policy decisions
related to minimizing AIV emergence in poultry, for which
quantitative disease-dynamic models could be of service.
The  article is organized in three sections to reﬂect the stages
of  emergence: (1) wildlife reservoir dynamics and spillover
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND licenseto  poultry, (2) transmission within poultry ﬂocks and (3)
transmission between poultry ﬂocks (Fig. 2). For each stage
of  emergence, we highlight key quantitative data that are
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Fig. 1. Diagram illustrating a simple dynamic-disease model. The host population is divided into “compartments” that differ by disease status (left); in this
case  susceptible, infectious or recovered (and presumed to be immune). Disease-dynamic models are a mathematical description of pathogen transmission.
f how th
r of 5 an
urrentlySolving  or conducting simulations with such a model gives an estimate o
example  shown here is for a pathogen with a basic reproductive numbe
individuals.  Here the force of infection is proportional to the number of c
currently available and could be incorporated into models
focused on reducing uncertainty in policy decisions. The
quantitative data we present are not comprehensive, rather
we  focus on presenting the range of values that have been
observed. We  also mention important data gaps, especially
with  regards to spillover processes because this is the least
understood stage of emergence. Although transmission and
evolution  are both important in outbreaks of AIV in poultry,
we  focus primarily on transmission because key epidemio-
logical processes such as the depletion of susceptible hosts
are  far more predictable than evolutionary processes, such
as  mutation and reassortment.
2.  Reservoir dynamics and spillover to poultry
2.1. Control policies
Control  measures for preventing either maintenance
within wildlife populations or spillover to poultry are
not  currently conducted in wildlife populations (Cardona,
2005; Clark and Hall, 2006). In fact, some wildlife species
are  not even considered when evaluating biosecurity meas-
ures  in commercial poultry operations (McQuiston et al.,
2005),  and operations with low biosecurity (i.e., backyard
ﬂocks or gamebird facilities) allow open access for wildlife
species (Slota et al., 2011). Typical biosecurity activities,
which are common in commercial operations, aim to pre-
vent  direct contact between high-risk wildlife species and
poultry  (e.g., rodent control and wild bird exclusion; USDA,
2012).  Many facilities also implement measures to pre-
vent  indirect contact with wildlife (e.g., contamination of
food  and water supplies by wildlife), which may  also be
important (Fig. 2A). Developing general policies to pre-
vent  spillover from wildlife to domestic poultry will require
additional quantitative information on wildlife contact
rates  with poultry and risk assessment to determine whiche risk of infection within a population (i.e., ﬂock) changes over time. The
d a generation time of 5 days spreading through a population of 10,000
 infectious birds expressed as a ratio of the total population size.
wildlife  species have the highest potential to transmit virus
to  poultry.
2.2. Quantitative host population data
The key quantities required to understand transmission
of AIVs include host demographic dynamics, population
sizes, contact structure among host individuals, suscep-
tibility and host species composition. The picture for
wild  hosts is complicated relative to poultry populations
because it involves multiple species, each with ecologically
determined demographics, spatial interactions and move-
ment  patterns. Furthermore, numerous species are known
to  be susceptible to AIVs but their role in maintenance
within the wild-host reservoir system and/or transmission
to  poultry is unclear (Boyce et al., 2009; Fig. 2A). Popula-
tion movement coupled with environmental transmission
is  the main reason for this lack of understanding: multiple
species that move freely about their environment become
contaminated or get infected by environmental sources
(Henaux and Samuel, 2011; Brown et al., 2013a,b). Another
reason  is that maintenance and spillover are distinct pro-
cesses  that are both important for AIV outbreaks in poultry:
spillover force of infection is driven by the product of con-
tact  rate between reservoir and target-host populations,
probability of infection of the target-host given contact, and
pathogen  prevalence in the reservoir at the time of contact
(Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009).
Field  surveys suggest that dabbling ducks, especially
mallards (Anas platyrhynchos), are an important reservoir
for  most AIV subtypes, including subtypes that can lead
to  HPAI in poultry (Hinshaw et al., 1980; Stallknecht and
Shane,  1988b; Stallknecht et al., 1990; Olsen et al., 2006;
Stallknecht and Brown, 2008; DeLiberto et al., 2009; Wilcox
et  al., 2011; Bahl et al., 2013). In addition to being a primary
reservoir for AIVs, mallards are also the most abundant
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Fig. 2. Pathways of emergence of AIVs in commercial poultry operations. Red arrows indicate transitions between the different processes in emergence:
AIV  spillover from wildlife to AIV spread within poultry ﬂocks on a single operation to AIV spread between poultry operations. (A) Spillover mechanisms
from  wildlife (adapted from Franklin, 2008). Arrows represent movement of AIVs. Bold arrows indicate transmission links that are strongly supported by
empirical  studies, thin arrows indicate connections that are supported by limited studies and dotted arrows indicate pathways that remain unexplored.
Indirect  AIV transmission pathways from wild waterfowl (I and II) to poultry (VI) include: drinking contaminated water (III) or contacting non-waterfowl
bird  species (V) or wild mammals (IV) that were infected through III. IV may  also be infected by scavenging infected waterfowl carcasses by wild mammals.
*Note  that the importance of direct transmission routes from waterfowl to poultry is well-supported in mixed-species backyard ﬂocks but the importance
of  this connection in transmission to commercial poultry remains to be determined. It is possible that any of these links involve an intermediate link such
as  human shoes, etc. (B) AIV spread within poultry operations. Once AIV infects poultry in a farm, it can be transmitted directly to other individuals or
indirectly  through contaminated water, fomites or air. (C) AIV spread between poultry operations. The mechanisms are variable and currently uncertain,
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uck species in North America (Drilling et al., 2002). Fur-
hermore, most experimental studies of AIVs in wild birds
ave  been in mallards, and thus there are more quanti-
ative data on AIVs in mallards than in any other wildlife
ost. Dose–response and contact experiments support the
dea  that mallards are highly susceptible to most wild-
ird  origin LPAIVs based on: (1) mallards can be infected
fter exposure to low inoculation doses with multiple sub-
ypes  of LPAIVs (Swayne and Slemons, 2008; Brown et al.,
013a,b),  (2) high rates of infection occur after exposure
o  high doses, and (3) transmission to contact birds occurs
eadily  (Webster et al., 1978; Hinshaw et al., 1980; Kida
t  al., 1980; Alexander et al., 1986; Swayne, 2007; Mundt
t  al., 2009). Thus, further progress in understanding LPAIV
ersistence mechanisms and spillover risk could be madeolor in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
by  parameterizing dynamic models with population ecol-
ogy  data from mallards. We  focus on mallards as the “wild
hosts”  for the remainder of this article.
Population size over space and time can be extremely
variable and difﬁcult to measure for mallard populations,
in part because this species is very abundant and widely
distributed across North America (USFWS, 2012b). Breed-
ing  population size from aerial surveys conducted over
parts  of Canada and the north-central USA (∼1.3 million
sq. mi.) was estimated at 10.6 ± 0.3 million birds in 2012,
an  estimate about 15% above the 2011 estimate, 40% above
long-term averages, but slightly lower than the maximum
of  ∼11.2 million breeding birds reported in 1958 (USFWS,
2012b). Reproductive success and annual survival are also
similarly  variable. For example, estimates of nest success
terinary380 K.M. Pepin et al. / Preventive Ve
range from 1 to 17% nests hatching at least one egg and
vary  with habitat type and breeding chronology (Emery
et  al., 2005). Survival probabilities for females after ﬂedg-
ing  vary by age and breeding status (i.e., breeding survival
tends  to be higher than nonbreeding survival; Coluccy et al.,
2008)  and population growth rate is sensitive to variability
in  nonbreeding survival and other vital rates (Coluccy et al.,
2008).  Also, mallard populations may  increase or decrease
depending on environmental conditions (e.g., availability
of  prairie-pond habitat) or variability in phenology (e.g.,
timing  of nest initiation), which can vary by precipitation
or habitat availability (Greenwood et al., 1995). Thus a
constant  population size over space and time cannot be
assumed, as it can for commercial poultry populations.
Challenge studies in mallards have shown that age-
structure does not seem to be a major determinant of
infection dynamics, except on a very broad scale: mal-
lards  < 1 month old show higher viral loads (Costa et al.,
2010b)  and mallards < 1 year are at least twice as likely to
be  found infected (Munster et al., 2007; Farnsworth et al.,
2012)  than those in other age-classes, suggesting that they
may  be more susceptible or infectious. Similarly, ﬁeld data
demonstrate a difference between hatch year and after-
hatch  year birds. The difference in the ﬁeld is likely due to
immunity in adults that have been previously exposed to
multiple  LPAIV strains (Wilcox et al., 2011). With regards to
differences  between the sexes, results are mixed. For exam-
ple,  two studies found that males can shed up to 2 orders
of  magnitude more virus by the cloacal route in challenge
experiments (Pepin et al., 2012) and are 15% more likely
to  be found infected in natural populations as compared
to  females (Farnsworth et al., 2012), but other studies have
found  no differences between the sexes (Krauss et al., 2004;
Munster  et al., 2007; Wilcox et al., 2011). Because mallard
populations tend to be male-biased, averaging 1.33 males
for  every female in over-wintering populations (Drilling
et  al., 2002), determining whether there exists signiﬁcant
transmission biases due to sex may  be important.
As with most host populations, host mixing is likely
not homogenous but the quantitative, or even qualitative
nature of host contact patterns is not yet documented suf-
ﬁciently  to justify a different assumption. Bird banding
data are available for quantifying mallard movement pat-
terns  (Miller et al., 2013b) and an ongoing network analysis
will  provide a much needed quantitative understanding of
annual  mallard movement patterns throughout continen-
tal  USA (CT Webb, unpublished data). An additional factor is
the  ability for wild migratory birds to introduce a complete
genome (unreassorted) or segments of AIV intercontinen-
tally. The observed frequency of AIV reassortment events
between continents varies greatly between studies ranging
from  0.25 to 45.0 percent (Miller et al., 2013a). Such translo-
cation  via migratory birds contributed in part to the spread
of  highly pathogenic Asian strain H5N1 out of Southern
China and Southeast Asia across Central Asia, into Europe
and  Africa (Kilpatrick et al., 2006; Salzberg et al., 2007;
Prosser et al., 2009; Gaidet et al., 2010; Gilbert et al., 2010;
Takekawa et al., 2010). Also, recent phylogenetic analyses
of  A(H7N9) indicates that migratory birds from at least two
distinct  and distant ﬂyways (Mediterranean-Black Sea and
East  Asian) may  have contributed to its emergence (Gao Medicine 113 (2014) 376–397
et  al., 2013; Kageyama et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2013). The
potential dissemination of newly emerging AIVs within
Eurasia to North America via migratory movements of birds
remains  a concern (Feare, 2007; Gauthier-Clerc et al., 2007)
because  phylogenetic analyses suggest that reassortment
between North American and Eurasian AIVs occurs in sev-
eral  groups of migratory birds including sea ducks (Fries
et  al., 2013), dabbling ducks (Koehler et al., 2008; Wahlgren
et  al., 2008), shorebirds and gulls (Makarova et al., 1999).
Thus,  if these introductions are frequent, they could be
important in AIV persistence and should be considered in
mechanistic descriptions of AIV dynamics.
A quantitative understanding of interactions between
wild hosts and poultry (i.e., frequency or rate of contact) is
fundamental for parameterizing the spillover process in a
transmission model. Also, for AIV, contact must be quanti-
ﬁed  in two ways: directly through bird-to-bird interactions
and indirectly through sharing the same environment dur-
ing  a time period that virus can remain stable outside
the host. For example, an experiment employing camera
traps that record the number of direct contacts between
wild hosts and poultry over a set time period in a set-
ting with low biosecurity (i.e., backyard ﬂock) would be
one  way  to quantify direct contact rates. Data on indirect
contact rates could also be extracted from the same exper-
iment  by summarizing the amount of time spent by wild
hosts  in the same environment or water sources as poultry.
Other  indirect contact data could be derived from longitu-
dinal  sampling of environmental DNA typed to species. In
the  USA, areas where mallard populations overlap poul-
try  populations at a coarse resolution are being described
qualitatively (CT Webb, unpublished data), but direct mea-
surement  of wild host-poultry interaction remains to be
conducted.
2.3.  Quantitative AIV surveillance data
The most common LPAIV subtypes found in mallards
are: H3N8, H4N6 and H6N4 (Krauss et al., 2004; Olsen et al.,
2006;  Munster et al., 2007; Wilcox et al., 2011), although
one  study has found H5N2 to be common in the USA (40%
of  all virus isolations; Pedersen et al., 2010). Although
HPAIV strains of H5N1 occur in dabbling ducks in some
parts  of Asia, northern Africa and Eastern Europe; in the
USA  only LPAIV strains of H5N1 viruses (from the North-
American lineage) have been detected – despite numerous
large-scale sampling studies (Hanson et al., 2003; Krauss
et  al., 2004; Pedersen et al., 2010; Wilcox et al., 2011). In
fact,  considering all subtypes, only LPAIV strains have been
found  in wild birds to date in the USA.
Prevalence of LPAIVs in mallards varies spatially along
north-south portions of migratory ﬂyways from >10 to 15%
in  the northern staging grounds to <1–2% on wintering
grounds (Stallknecht and Shane, 1988a; Goekjian et al.,
2011).  LPAIVs are most prevalent in late summer/early
fall, after the breeding season and during pre-migrational
staging (Wilcox et al., 2011). Annual prevalence ranges
from 1 to 5% during early winter and the spring migra-
tion to as high as 30–40% in early fall and during the fall
migration (Stallknecht and Shane, 1988a; Webster et al.,
1992;  Hanson et al., 2003; Krauss et al., 2004; Wilcox
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t al., 2011). More long-term longitudinal sampling in areas
here  prevalence is highest at the annual peak is needed to
xamine  whether these patterns are shared by all subtypes
qually and to understand the environmental, population
r  immunity factors that cause them. These data also would
rovide  crucial information for verifying whether or not
urrent  disease-dynamic models accurately capture trans-
ission  processes in important wild hosts and poultry.
.4.  Quantitative experimental data
Numerous LPAIV challenge studies have been con-
ucted in mallards. These quantitative data are the main
mpirical data source for parameterizing disease-dynamic
odels (Rohani et al., 2009). While there is inherent vari-
tion  in data among studies due to differences in virus,
ost  individual and experimental design, there are emer-
ent  patterns in mallards (Table 1) that are different from
hose  in gallinaceous poultry (e.g., chickens and turkeys;
undt et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2011). Most challenge
xperiments to date have characterized readily measur-
ble parameters of infection, such as incubation period,
uration of infection, clinical outcome, viral shedding rates,
iral  persistence in water and antibody response (Slemons
nd  Easterday, 1978; Webster et al., 1978; Kida et al.,
980;  Mundt et al., 2009; Spackman et al., 2009; Davidson
t  al., 2010; Nazir et al., 2010; VanDalen et al., 2010;
ebarbenchon et al., 2012). More recent studies have even
egun  to quantify factors that explain infection variability
n  nature such as host-individual health status (e.g., stress,
utritional condition; Arsnoe et al., 2011; Reperant et al.,
011)  and infectious doses (Swayne and Slemons, 2008;
rown  et al., 2013a,b). However, few studies quantify other
mmunity  and transmission-related quantities, such as the
uration  and strength of immunity to the same (homosub-
ypic) or different (heterosubtypic) subtypes (Park et al.,
004;  Fereidouni et al., 2009; Costa et al., 2010a; Jourdain
t  al., 2010; Pepin et al., 2012) and transmission rates
nd probabilities (Achenbach and Bowen, 2011), which are
undamental  components of LPAIV epidemiology. This is
ainly  due to difﬁculties with maintaining wild hosts in
aptivity  for longer than 2–3 months, and simulating con-
act  rates between wild hosts and poultry under natural
onditions. While it is challenging to interpret absolute
easures of laboratory-based transmission rates, quan-
ifying  the relative importance of different mechanisms
f transmission on individual-level infection parameters
s  both interpretable and important for describing AIV
ynamics quantitatively.
In  Table 1, we have focused on LPAIV in mallards because
PAIV strains are not thought to contribute to the epi-
emiology of AIV in North American wild bird populations
Hanson et al., 2003; Krauss et al., 2004; Pedersen et al.,
010;  Wilcox et al., 2011). However, experiments have
nvestigated the effects of HPAIVs nonetheless. Most HPAIV
rials  in mallards have been conducted with H5N1 HPAIV
nd  these data indicate infection differs signiﬁcantly from
PAIV,  both in regards to clinical disease and patterns of
hedding. As opposed to LPAIV, the predominate route of
5N1  HPAIV viral shedding in mallards and other water-
owl  is via the respiratory tract (Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2004; Medicine 113 (2014) 376–397 381
Brown  et al., 2006; Keawcharoen et al., 2008). Viral shed-
ding  also occurs in the feces, but is at a lower titer and
shorter duration. In addition to differences in shedding,
virulence in mallards and other ducks can range from no
clinical  signs to 100% mortality depending on the clade of
H5N1  HPAIV, host species and age (Perkins and Swayne,
2002; Sturm-Ramirez et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006;
Pantin-Jackwood and Swayne, 2007).
2.5. Models
Transmission models have been used to synthesize
subsets of the data described above in order to gener-
ate additional quantitative insight into different aspects of
LPAIV  transmission among wild birds in the USA. Example
applications are quantiﬁcation of the role of environmen-
tal transmission in maintenance of LPAIVs (Breban et al.,
2009)  and the relative importance of trade routes and
migration as sources of introduction of HPAIV strains from
Asia  (Winker and Gibson, 2010). However, risk models
of  spillover of LPAIVs to poultry have yet to include the
spillover mechanism explicitly, largely due to the paucity
of  appropriate quantitative data describing interactions or
transmission at the wildlife-poultry interface. With suit-
able  empirical information at hand, such models would
take  into account known geographic distributions of wild
bird  migration routes, staging areas and breeding sites in
decomposing the transmission risk of LPAIVs to poultry
operations.
2.6.  Priorities for quantitative research
Although there are a number of data gaps, there is an
appropriate literature base and databases for which large-
scale  models could be developed. For example, continental
determinants of LPAIV prevalence in wild birds have been
identiﬁed by analytical models (Farnsworth et al., 2012).
Further quantiﬁcation with available data includes: (1)
linking  the density of poultry to that of mallard abundance
indices (USFWS, 2012a) at a continental scale in space and
time  using hunter-harvest and National Agricultural Statis-
tics  Service data (e.g., Fig. 3), and (2) examining the effects
of  annual changes in the number of newly susceptible birds
on  annual continental distributions of LPAIV in waterfowl
using national data on waterfowl recruitment (e.g., indices
used  to set harvest regulations such as female age ratios;
Johnson et al., 1997; USFWS, 2012a) and LPAIV distribu-
tions from the U.S. Wild Bird AIV Surveillance program
(DeLiberto et al., 2009; Farnsworth et al., 2012). The ﬁrst
analysis  would help to identify regions where commercial
poultry may  have a high risk of spillover and thus where
surveillance should be increased and where contact experi-
ments  would help to quantify actual risk. It should be noted
that  because there is currently no database summarizing
the spatial locations of backyard poultry, the results would
exclude  risk from spillover to this sector. Thus, the overall
risk  to commercial poultry may  be underestimated because
backyard holdings, which could be a source of virus in com-
mercial  operations, have a higher risk of spillover from
wild  birds due to their lower biosecurity practices. The sec-
ond  analysis will help with understanding how mallard
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Table 1
Quantitative values of the infection and transmission processes in mallards as determined from experimental data. We focused on results from cloacal and fecal samples since these are known to have the highest
LPAIV  titers in mallards. Note that not all of these values would be used in a single model. Also, the table is not meant to be comprehensive in terms of capturing every sound experimental study, rather we aimed
to  capture the range of values that have been observed using several examples.
Parameter Rangea-VI Rangeb-PCR Units Experimental
measure
LPAIV strainsc Dose Host age References Caveatsd
Infection
Minimum
infectious dose
or  BID50
≤10, BID50:
103.1, 101.9
Virions Minimum
number of viral
particles  that
lead  to an
infectious
individual
H6N1, H6N3,
H8N4, H4N8,
H5N1
Variable 3 weeks to
1  month
Swayne and
Slemons
(2008),  Brown
et  al. (2013a,b)
Brown: Other strains
were  tested and did
not  cause infection at
doses  as high as 101.9;
Swayne: BID50 (rather
than minimum
infectious dose) for
mallard-origin  viruses.
A  chicken-origin virus
(H4N8)  had a BID50 of
103.3. Swayne’s study
was performed in Pekin
ducks  (mallard-derived
domestic duck).
Incubation period 0.5–2 days 1–2 Days Number of
days  between
inoculation and
detection  of
virus
H5N2, H3N6,
H7N2;  H3N8
106–108 1–8-
months
Webster et al.
(1978),  Kida
et  al. (1980),
Spackman et al.
(2009),  Costa
et  al. (2010b)
The ﬁrst sample was
collected  at 1 day, thus
earlier  incubation
times  could not be
determined;  Webster
and  Kida manuscripts
detected viral shedding
at  <1 DPI
Detection period
(IP)
7 7 Days Number of
days  that virus
is  detected in
>75%  of
infected ducks
H5N2, H3N8,
H4N6, H7N7
106 3–4 weeks,
5–6
months
Spackman et al.
(2009),  Costa
et  al. (2010b),
Jourdain et al.
(2010),  Brown
et  al. (2012),
Pepin et al.
(2012)
Mean across replicates
and  experiments
Peak shedding
period
1–7 1–7 Days Time points
during which
shedding rates
are  >103
H3N8, H5N2;
H7N2;  H1N2;
H4N1;
106–108 3 weeks to
8  months
Webster et al.
(1978),  Kida
et  al. (1980),
Spackman et al.
(2009),  Brown
et  al. (2012)
Means across replicates
and  experiments.
Peak shedding titer 103.4–107 104–107 Virions Number of viral
particles  shed
at  the peak of
infection
H3N8, H5N2;
H7N2;  H1N2;
H4N1;
106–108 3 weeks to
8  months
Webster et al.
(1978),  Kida
et  al. (1980),
Spackman et al.
(2009),  Brown
et  al. (2012)
Means across replicates
and  experiments. Some
birds  excrete up to 109
EID50/g feces.
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Length of
homosubtypic
immunity
? ? Days Number of days
that  infection with
a  strain of the same
H/N  subtype is
suppressed
No studies to
our  knowledge
Length of
heterosubtypic
immunity
? ? Days Number of days
that  infection with
a  strain from a
different  H/N
subtype  is
suppressed
No studies to
our  knowledge
Strength of
homosubtypic
immunity on
shedding
Not  quantiﬁed
(but not 100%)
% Percent reduction
in  total viral load
that  occurs during
secondary  infection
with  a strain of the
same  H/N subtype
compared with
primary  infection
H7N7 108.7 3 months Jourdain et al.
(2010)
Data are not presented
quantitatively
Strength  of
heterosubtypic
immunity on
shedding
99.2  % Percent reduction
in  total viral load
that  occurs during
secondary  infection
with  a strain from a
different  H/N
subtype  compared
with  primary
infection
H3N8 → H4N6;
H5N2 &
H3N8
106–108.7 1–6
months
Costa et al.
(2010a),
Jourdain et al.
(2010),  Pepin
et  al. (2012)
Second infections were
conducted  21 days
after  ﬁrst. Arrow
represents one-way
cross-immunity assay;
&  represents two-way.
Strength  of
homosubtypic
immunity on IP
75 % Percent reduction
in  IP that occurs
during  secondary
infection with a
strain  of the same
H/N  subtype
compared with
primary  infection
H7N7 108.7 3 months Jourdain et al.
(2010)
Strength of
heterosubtypic
immunity on IP
0–60, 45 % Percent reduction
in  IP that occurs
during  secondary
infection with a
strain  from a
different  H/N
subtype  compared
with  primary
infection
H5N2 &
H3N8,
H3N8  → H4N6
106 4 months Costa et al.
(2010a), Pepin
et  al. (2012)
Second infections were
conducted  21 days
after  ﬁrst. Arrow
represents one-way
cross-immunity assay;
&  represents two-way.
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Table 1 (Continued)
Parameter Rangea-VI Rangeb-PCR Units Experimental
measure
LPAIV
strainsc
Dose Host age References Caveatsd
Direct transmission
Transmission
probability
100  % % of hosts infected
given  contact with
an  infected host
(assumes  that
probability is
constant
throughout the
infectious  period)
H5N2,
H7N3
NR 2–4
months
Achenbach and
Bowen  (2011)
There were only 4
contact  ducks in each
experiment.  Results are
likely  strain-dependent
(Sturm-Ramirez et al.,
2005). This experiment
tested  contact
transmission in 23
different  strains of
H5N1  isolated from a
variety of domestic and
wild  bird host species.
22/23  strains
transmitted by contact
and  one of these only
transmitted  to 1/2
contacts.
Transmission  rate 4+ Infections/day Number of hosts
infected  per day by
one  infected bird
(assumes  a
constant  daily rate
over  the infectious
period)
H5N2,
H7N3
NR 2–4
months
Achenbach and
Bowen  (2011)
There were only 4
contact  ducks in each
experiment  and all 4
were  infected in 1–2
days  following
exposure.
Transmission
probability
function
f(x) = ? f(x)  = ? % % of hosts infected
given  contact with
an  infected host
and  viral load in
the  infected host
over  the entire
infectious period
This relationship
remains unknown and
thus most models do
not  include effects of
within-host  viral
dynamics  on
epidemiological
outcome.
Environmental transmission
Water  uptake rate 0.3 L/kg body
mass/day
Amount of water
drunk  per day per
host
Isanhart et al.
(2011)
Virus decay rate in
water
0.05 ± 0.04 at
5 ◦C; 2.8 ± 3.1
40 ◦Ce
Virions/day Number of
infectious viral
particles  that decay
per  day
H1N1;
H2N4;
H3N2;
H4N6;
H5N2;
H6N4;
H7N6;
H8N4;
H9N2;
H10N7;
H11N6;
H12N5
NR NR Handel et al.
(2013)
Decay rates vary
dramatically
depending on strain
and  water
temperature. Other
factors  such as salinity,
pH  and organic content
affect  decay rates too
but  these were not
tested  in Handel et al.
(2013).
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Transmission
probability
75% at
102.8–103.1
100% at
102.8–103.1
% Infected
at
virions/ml
water
Quantitative
relationship
between the
likelihood of
infection  given
exposure to a given
viral  concentration
H4N6 NR 3 or 6
months
VanDalen et al.
(2010)
There were 8 contact
ducks.  Ideally, we need
to  understand this
relationship  over range
of  viral concentrations.
We  also need to
understand  how
transmission from a
given viral
concentration impacts
subsequent  infection
dynamics  over range of
viral  concentrations.
For  example, Van
Dalen  et al. determined
that  exposure to viral
concentrations  in
water  between 102.8
and 103.1 leads to
infectious periods of
2.3–4.3  days and peak
viral  loads of 102.1 and
104.2 PCR EID50
depending on whether
birds  were 3 or 6
months.  Thus,
subsequent
transmission may  be
possible following
infection at these levels
of  water exposure.
a Range-VI: gives the measured range of values in the referenced studies that are from virus isolation results.
b Range-VI: gives the measured range of values in the referenced studies that are from RT-PCR results.
c Strains – host species: lists the strain-host species combinations that were used in the referenced studies.
d Caveats: lists the experimental conditions that may  have led to the highest and lowest values.
e Mean ± standard deviation.
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f poultry
marketing (marketing birds after clinical signs are appar-
ent,  when shedding is very low), trade/movement bans,
disinfection and, rarely, vaccination (Halvorson, 2002;
2 “For the purpose of disease control programs and international trade
in domestic poultry products, HPAI is deﬁned in the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations, Title 9, Section 53.1 as: (a) Any inﬂuenza virus that kills at least
75 percent of eight, 4- to 6-week-old susceptible chickens, within ten
days following intravenous inoculation with 0.2 ml  of a 1:10 dilution of a
bacteria-free, infectious allantoic ﬂuid. (b) Any H5 or H7 virus that doesFig. 3. Distribution of poultry and wild mallards in the USA. (A) Density o
1980  and 2010 based on hunter harvest data.
population dynamics affect LPAIV risk across space and
time.  A dynamical model parameterized with the recruit-
ment  data as well as mallard movement data would allow
for  a quantitative understanding of the spatio-temporal
distribution of LPAIV prevalence, which is important for
risk  assessment.
The next step would be to design empirical surveillance
studies that temporally monitor mallard-poultry contact
rates,  coupled with estimating prevalence of infectious
LPAIVs in mallard populations in select locations where
there is the greatest overlap of poultry and high LPAIV
prevalence in mallards. These studies should include both
backyard  and commercial operations with appropriate
sampling designs that account for the differences in the
density  of holdings and biosecurity. For example, surveil-
lance  in backyard operations should quantify both direct
and  indirect contact rates between mallards and poul-
try  and monitor LPAIV prevalence in both populations. In
contrast,  surveillance strategies in more secure commer-
cial  poultry operations would beneﬁt from monitoring all
wildlife  and domestic species on the premises as well as
environmental surfaces because LPAIVs are rarely detected
and  the direct role of mallards in spillover is less clear.
This would provide crucial data for quantifying the risk
of  transmission given prevalence on the premises as well
as  identifying sources (biological or environmental) where
LPAIVs  are detected most frequently in close proximity to
poultry.
3.  Transmission within poultry ﬂocks
We now turn from the potential spillover of LPAIVs
from wild birds into poultry to ﬂock-level control methods,
demographics and LPAIV prevalence.3.1. Control policies
Detection  of AIV in poultry occurs at the ﬂock-level:
once conﬁrmed in a single surveillance sample, the whole farms. (B) Thirty year annual average mallard band encounters between
ﬂock is determined to be infected. When HPAIV (see
note below for Ofﬁce International des Epizooties (OIE)
deﬁnition)2 is detected on a farm, depopulation and other
control  activities outlined in the HPAI Response Plan are
conducted in an effort to halt within-farm spread and pre-
vent  transmission to other farms (USDA, 2012).
Similar control strategies are applied to LPAIV strains
that are considered to be high-risk for mutation to HPAIV
(i.e.,  H5 or H7), although LPAIV outbreaks are usually man-
aged  without depopulation (Halvorson, 2009). The key
decisions at the ﬂock level involve determining depopula-
tion  or controlled-marketing strategies that will minimize
transmission, contamination and time to virus elimination.
Detailed response actions for H5 or H7 LPAIV in USA  poul-
try  are carried out in accordance with each state’s H5/H7
LPAIV Initial State Response and Containment Plan.
In  the case of detection of non-notiﬁable LPAIV strains
(i.e., non-H5 and non-H7 strains LPAIV), options for on-
farm  control methods are more numerous and do not
require federal action according to national or state
response plans. The state in which the outbreak is located is
in  charge of the response. In these cases, cost-effectiveness
of different control options within an operation and effects
on  continuity of business are primary considerations. The
main  on-farm control options considered are controllednot meet the criteria in paragraph (a) of this deﬁnition, but has an amino
acid sequence at the hemagglutinin cleavage site that is compatible with
HPAI viruses. (c) Any inﬂuenza virus that is not a H5 or H7 subtype and
that kills one to ﬁve chickens and grows in cell culture in the absence of
trypsin.”
K.M. Pepin et al. / Preventive Veterinary
Table 2
Population size distribution of production farms in the USA (USDA, 2011).
Turkey farms are meat production. Values are means with standard errors
shown in brackets.
Number of birds Broiler % (SE) Table egg % (SE) Turkey % (SE)
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b<50,000 11.7 (0.4) 34.3 (2.5) 73.4 (0.5)
50,000–99,999 56.3 (0.6) 12.0 (1.9) 23.9 (0.4)
100,000+ 32.0 (0.5) 53.7 (2.7) 2.7 (0.3)
alvorson et al., 2003). For example, because indemnity
as not available to producers for depopulation of non-H5
r  -H7 LPAIV outbreaks in California in 2000–2002, con-
rolled  marketing was used successfully to control an H6N2
PAI  outbreak (Cardona, 2005). This involved on-farm,
ctive surveillance testing of ﬂocks prior to movement to
laughter,  thus reducing the risk of moving actively shed-
ing  ﬂocks. If the ﬂock was determined to be clinically
nfected, movement was prohibited until after the ﬂock had
eroconverted. Live-haul operators were required to follow
esignated routes that were chosen to avoid exposure of
oultry  ﬂocks on facilities adjacent to roadways. Most of
he  inﬂuenza virus that is shed from a positive ﬂock occurs
uring  the ﬁrst two weeks of infection, and orderly market-
ng  3–4 weeks post-onset of clinical signs is currently used
o  reduce economic loss to turkey producers (Halvorson,
003). Similar, voluntary controlled-marketing programs
ave  been used to control seasonal LPAI outbreaks in turkey
ocks  in Minnesota (Cardona, 2005).
.2. Quantitative host population data
In contrast to mallard populations, the population
tructure and demographic dynamics are well deﬁned
or  commercial poultry (Fig. 4A). Nearly all poultry
perations with greater than $1000 USD of agricul-
ural sales are surveyed by the Census of Agriculture
www.agcensus.usda.gov), excluding public, industrial and
razing association land (USDA, 2008a). The industry is
4.6%  production farms (65.6% broiler chickens, 2.3% table-
gg  chickens and 16.7% meat turkeys) and 15.4% breeder
arms (USDA, 2011). Flock sizes in production farms vary
rom  <50,000 to >100,000 birds (Table 2, USDA, 2011). The
ifespans  and ages of each poultry type within a ﬂock are
omogeneous in production farms. Meat poultry are very
hort-lived; on average marketing or slaughter occurs at 7.2
eeks  for broiler chickens, 14.2 weeks for turkey hens and
9.7  weeks for turkey toms (USDA, 2011). Table-egg layers
ive  for an average of 88.7 weeks (molted) and 64.2 weeks
non-molted) from placement in the house until removal
roughly 50% of commercial ﬂocks are molted; USDA,
011). In about 67% of table-egg layer ﬂocks, birds are kept
n  cages such that contact between birds in the same cage
ccurs  readily while between-cage bird contacts are possi-
le  but more limited. However, more widespread contact
s  possible indirectly through shared water systems, feed
ystems  and ventilation. In the remaining table-egg layer
ocks  and all broiler chickens and turkeys, birds are reared
n  the ﬂoor and could potentially contact a larger number
f  other birds.
All  production poultry are bred through the “primary
reeding system” which makes up the smallest proportion Medicine 113 (2014) 376–397 387
of  all breeders. For example, 10% of breeder farms for chick-
ens  (broilers and layers) are primary breeders compared
with 90% that are multiplier farms (USDA, 2011). Thus, well
under  3% of all farms are primary breeders. Elite primary
breeders make up the smallest number of farms and the
number of farms per breeder category increases with ﬂow
through  the system (Fig. 4A). It is estimated that genetic
traits from the elite ﬂocks swamp the production ﬂocks in
about  5 years, meaning that there is roughly a ﬁve year lag
between  initial breeding and the time that a potentially dif-
ferent  genotype reaches production farms. Breeding farms
can  also have more complex age-structure than produc-
tion  ﬂocks but the details depend on the particular farm. In
general,  eggs are collected daily from broiler breeders and
brought  to the hatchery. Once hatched, chicks will be trans-
ferred  to a pullet farm or directly to the next breeder farm
at  one day of age to be reared to reproductive maturity.
Thus, there is no direct transfer of birds between breed-
ers  or between breeders and production farms. The only
direct  movement of birds is from pullet farms to production
farms.
Although the majority of commercial poultry are
included in the agricultural census, only a small proportion
of  the total poultry operations are included because many
small  non-commercial operations, or “backyard ﬂocks”
(21–35 birds on average) exist in the USA (Fig. 4B). A
recent study found that commercial poultry operations in
the  USA had an average of 1.9 backyard ﬂocks within 1
mile  of their perimeters (USDA, 2005; Garber et al., 2007),
while  in Colorado alone, 69% of poultry operations con-
tained  1–50 birds and only 6% had >200 birds (Smith
et al., 2012). In Denver and the surrounding metropoli-
tan cities, 2.2% of residences had backyard ﬂocks with a
higher  prevalence in suburban areas (1.55% of residences
in  metropolitan Denver, as compared with suburbs (4.4%)).
Most  ﬂocks were layers (80.6%) and 37.3% contained multi-
ple  species, including waterfowl, pigeons, peafowl, turkey
or  exhibition chickens (KL Pabilonia, unpublished data).
The  multi-host and other structural differences of the back-
yard  ﬂocks require a different model description because
these differences could impact subtype-speciﬁc transmis-
sion  dynamics (Duan et al., 2007).
Live-bird markets (LBMs) are another important small
holder poultry system in the USA (Fig. 4C). The major-
ity of the markets are located in a few states (California,
Florida, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; Mullaney,
2003). However, the origin of birds that enter the mar-
kets  could be almost anywhere in the USA because of
a  complex supply system for the numerous species that
may  be stocked (Bulaga et al., 2003) (Fig. 4C). Chickens
(spent layers, spent breeder hens, and broilers) are the
most  commonly stocked species, with ducks and guinea
fowl  among the next most common species (Garber, 2006;
Yee  et al., 2008). Other avian species may  include turkeys,
quail, chukkars/partridge, pheasant geese and peafowl.
Mammals, most often rabbits, are also common in the live-
animal  markets (Trock et al., 2003). The structure of the
LBM  system is different from backyard poultry although
there may  be informal interactions between them (Fig. 4).
Uniform  standards for surveillance, cleaning and disinfec-
tion  (including rest days where the markets are completely
388 K.M. Pepin et al. / Preventive Veterinary Medicine 113 (2014) 376–397
Fig. 4. Structure of the poultry industry in the USA. The industry consists of 3 main sectors: commercial (A; multiple colors), backyard (B; brown) and
live-bird  market system (C; purple). Dotted gray arrows indicate connections between different sectors. Numbers on arrows indicate the percentage of
poultry  that are typically moved between the indicated locations. (A) Production begins with several rounds of breeding to control host genetics. Elite
breeder  ﬂocks send eggs to the hatchery (H) where chicks hatch, which takes about 3–5 weeks. Chicks leave hatcheries at 1 day-old. Most chicks will go to
a  pullet farm (P) for 18 weeks before the next breeder farm for variable amounts of time (determined by the breeder), although some may  go directly to
the  next breeder farm. Some table-egg layers will skip the great-grandparent breeding phase. At the ﬁnal stage of breeding (i.e., multiplier farms), broiler
chickens  and 43% of turkeys will go directly from a hatchery to a broiler farm or turkey grower, while table-egg layers typically go to a pullet farm before
being  transferred to a table-egg production farm. The three different types of commercial poultry (turkey, green; broiler chickens, black; and table-egg
layers,  orange) are bred and reared on separate farms, often by separate companies. (B) and (C) The supply chain for backyard ﬂocks (BYF) and live-bird
markets  (LBM) involves multiple sources and poultry within each of these holdings incoming and outgoing poultry within each of these sources may  contact
ird, swa
r LBMS.
raders (each  other (i.e., none of these are all-in, all-out operations). Note that “b
between  BYF and LBMS and thus do not belong exclusively to either BYF o
Garber,  2006) and unpublished data from surveys of small-scale poultry t
depopulated and cleaned) were implemented in 2008 and
have  decreased the incidence of AIV in these markets (Trock
and  Huntley, 2010).
3.3.  Quantitative AIV surveillance data
There is a well-deﬁned process for AIV surveillance in
poultry that includes both passive and active methods.
The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) documents
2.0–2.7 million tests per year for AIV in commercial poul-
try.  Results are reported in the NPIP annual report. Samples
taken  from monitored ﬂocks are sent to the National Ani-
mal  Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) where they are
assayed  for type A inﬂuenza. Type A inﬂuenza-positive
samples are then submitted to the National Veterinary
Services Laboratories (NVSL; Ames, Iowa) to screen for
the  presence of H5 or H7 subtypes, and the ﬁndings are
reported to the National Animal Health Policy and Pro-
grams  (NAHPP) staff in Riverdale, Maryland. Each year,p, auction, ﬂea market” events are the main mechanisms for interaction
 Data in this ﬁgure were derived from USDA censuses (USDA, 2005, 2011;
K. Pabilonia).
two  or three H5/H7 LPAIV cases are reported in commer-
cial poultry across the USA. Since 2004, all cases have
been LPAIV. Many detections are antibody positive cases,
where  live virus is not recovered. There have been four
documented HPAIV outbreaks in the US, one in the upper
Midwest and northeastern LBMs in 1924–1925, a limited
outbreak in New Jersey in 1929, one in commercial farms in
Pennsylvania in 1983–84 (where the initial outbreak strain
was  a LPAIV), and one in a LBM supplier in Gonzales (Pelzel
et  al., 2006), Texas, and two  associated LBMs in Houston,
Texas in 2004 (Swayne, 2008).
Assessing incidence of AIVs in the backyard and LBM
sectors was more challenging historically due to the low
level  of testing being conducted as compared with com-
mercial poultry. However, since 1986, states have routinely
conducted surveillance in LBMs because the markets were
shown  to be a source of AIV infection for commerial poul-
try.  In 2004, the US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and
Plant  Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS) published
terinary
u
c
d
(
t
o
t
a
w
t
p
t
d
t
m
H
U
3
s
s
c
L
1
p
m
(
2
t
m
(
t
(
2
o
2
2
i
t
d
a
2
D
e
e
t
a
p
t
7
(
i
m
w
n
p
(
eK.M. Pepin et al. / Preventive Ve
niform program standards (USDA, 2008b) to prevent and
ontrol  H5 and H7 LPAIV subtypes in the LBMs. The stan-
ards  cover (1) licensing, (2) AIV testing, (3) recordkeeping,
4) sanitation, (5) biosecurity, (6) surveillance, (7) inspec-
ion,  (8) trace backs, (9) premises registration, (10) trace
uts  when positives occur, and (11) response to posi-
ive  facilities. These standards apply to LBMs, auctions,
nd small sales, as well as to producers and distributors
ho supply the markets. Overall, since the initiation of
he  H5/H7 LPAIV LBM program, the total number of LBM-
ositive premises has decreased steadily from 63 in 2005
o  between 2 and 6 since 2009. Only LPAIVs have been
etected and the predominant subtype varies from year
o  year (NVSL annual report, Proceedings from the annual
eeting of the USAHA, 2009, 2010, 2011). In 2007, LPAIV
7N2,  which had been circulating in LBMs in the Northeast
nited States since 1994, was declared eradicated.
.4. Quantitative experimental data
In contrast to mallards where the dominant route of
hedding is through the cloaca or in feces, AIVs are mainly
hed  oropharyngeally in gallinaceous poultry (primarily
hickens and turkeys). Oropharyngeal shedding rates of
PAIV  in experimental studies range from undetectable to
00%  of the birds shedding. Typical titers from oral sam-
les  range from 101 to 105 50% egg infectious doses per
l  (EID50/ml) depending on the virus isolate and dose
Morales et al., 2009; Pillai et al., 2010; Spackman et al.,
010).  Cloacal shedding rates of LPAIV also occurs with
he  following differences relative to oral shedding: (1)
ore  birds have shedding rates below detection limits,
2)  detectable shedding is about 1–3 orders of magni-
ude lower and (3) peak loads are usually 1–2 days later
Morales et al., 2009; Jackwood et al., 2010; Ladman et al.,
010;  Spackman et al., 2010). HPAIVs are mostly shed
rally with titers as high as 105 to 108 EID50/ml  (Lee et al.,
005; Swayne and Pantin-Jackwood, 2006; Grund et al.,
011).  The incubation period for both LPAIV and HPAIV
s  24–48 h. The infectious period for LPAIV ranges from 1
o  7 days post-infection (DPI), with a peak of oral shed-
ing at about 2 DPI and a peak of cloacal shedding at
pproximately 4 DPI (Morales et al., 2009; Spackman et al.,
010,  2013). Rarely, virus can be recovered from birds 10
PI  (Morales et al., 2009; Pillai et al., 2010; Spackman
t al., 2010). The infectious proﬁle for HPAIV is the same
xcept that most birds (i.e., 75–100% of individual birds
hat  are infected with HPAIV, including chickens, turkeys
nd  domestic ducks) will not survive beyond the infectious
eriod, dying between 1 and 5 DPI. As with LPAIV infec-
ions, HPAIV survivors will usually not be infectious past
–10  DPI, but the absolute value depends on infectious dose
Swayne  et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2005).
The duration of immunity from vaccines or natural
nfections in poultry is not well understood, although
aternal immunity is known to last approximately two
eeks  after hatch. However, the role of pre-existing immu-
ity  to AIVs is probably of limited relevance to commercial
oultry in the USA because vaccination is not practiced
except for vaccination against H1 and H3 in turkey breed-
rs),  life-span is short and ﬂocks that become infected Medicine 113 (2014) 376–397 389
with HPAIV or H5 or H7 LPAIV are culled. Also, based
on a routine surveillance, it is very rare for a commer-
cial ﬂock to have antibody to AIV of any subtype. Thus,
an  appropriate model structure includes disease states:
susceptible-infectious-notiﬁed-depopulated, rather than
including  a compartment for immunity. However, in back-
yard  operations and LBMs where there is opportunity
for exposure to multiple strains, pre-existing immunity is
likely  very important.
AIVs  can be transmitted via several mechanisms in gal-
linaceous poultry: direct contact (bird-to-bird contact),
indirect contact (e.g., contact with feces, drinking water or
other  fomites) or aerosols (van der Goot et al., 2003; Leung
et  al., 2007; Yee et al., 2009; Spekreijse et al., 2011, 2013).
Few  studies have approached the transmission process
quantitatively. For example, quantiﬁcation of transmis-
sion rates absolutely (e.g., Gonzales et al., 2012; Saenz
et  al., 2012), determining the likelihood of transmission
from environmental sources or determining relative quan-
titative  differences among transmission mechanisms have
rarely  been done for either LPAIV or HPAIV in poultry.
One study using the LPAIV and HPAIV H5N2 outbreak iso-
lates  (chicken Pennsylvania 1983) found that 30% of the
susceptible chickens in the LPAIV group were infected,
whereas 100% were infected in the HPAIV group when
cages were placed 1.5 m apart (van der Goot et al., 2003).
Another study showed that transmission between cages
occurred earlier when fecal material was  allowed to drop
into  lower cages as compared with aerosol-only condi-
tions  (Yee et al., 2009). Finally, transmission to susceptible
chickens in cages placed 0.2, 0.4 or 1.1 m from infected
birds was  rare (6/72 chickens; only in one replicate trial;
Spekreijse et al., 2011). Collectively these data suggest that
aerosol  transmission is less important than contact, but
more  experiments are needed before the relative differ-
ence  between different transmission mechanisms can be
quantiﬁed.
Although  this article focuses on transmission processes,
it  is important to mention that evolutionary changes
should also be considered in quantitative analyses of the
transmission process. However, this remains an extremely
challenging aspect to understand because neither the con-
ditions  facilitating the genesis of reassortants nor those
that  impose selection for novel strains are understood well
enough  to predict risk of novel HPAIVs, although some
progress has been made using phylogenetic analyses (e.g.,
Duan  et al., 2007). These gaps highlight a key priority for
empirical quantitative research. For example, quantiﬁca-
tion of rates of co-infection and the propensity for different
subtypes to co-infect poultry (e.g., Pepin et al., 2013) and
wild  hosts are important for estimating rates of reassort-
ment and understanding ecological conditions that favor
them.  Likewise, in order to identify conditions that facili-
tate  adaptation, more experimental evolution studies (e.g.,
Giannecchini et al., 2010) and ﬁtness measures in poultry
with  isolates from wild hosts are needed.3.5. Models
Within-ﬂock outbreaks in poultry have been exten-
sively studied using mechanistic models (Savill et al., 2006,
terinary390 K.M. Pepin et al. / Preventive Ve
2008; Bos et al., 2007, 2009; Tiensin et al., 2007; Bouma
et  al., 2009; Malladi et al., 2011, 2012; Weaver et al.,
2012; Reeves et al., technical document available on-line).
Increased insight from within-ﬂock models compared to
wild-bird  models or system-wide models is largely because
of  the precision with which the population dynamics
of single ﬂock can be described. As with the between-
ﬂock models described in the next section, within-ﬂock
models typically employ either of two approaches: (1)
developing a simulation model that used condition-speciﬁc
parameters as inputs and produces outbreak dynamics
or transmission parameters as outputs, or (2) ﬁtting a
disease  dynamic model to outbreak data and estimating
transmission parameters (or other epidemiological quan-
tities)  from the outbreak data. The ﬁrst approach allows
for  a scenario-based understanding of within-ﬂock trans-
mission  behavior, whereas the second allows for direct
estimation of quantities such as transmission rate.
The  versatility of within-ﬂock dynamic-model
approaches has allowed for evaluation of both efﬁ-
cacy and consequences of alternative control methods.
For an example of the former, a within-ﬂock model was
used  to generate plausible outbreak data against which
the  efﬁcacy of various outbreak detection methods were
compared (Malladi et al., 2011). For an example of the lat-
ter,  a within-ﬂock model showed that vaccines conferring
incomplete protection could counterintuitively increase
the  infectiousness of a ﬂock, by delaying the time to detec-
tion  and depopulation (Savill et al., 2006). Within-ﬂock
models have also been used to: (1) infer important events
–  such as the day of introduction – from mortality data (Bos
et  al., 2007), (2) estimate the risk of HPAIV transmission
due to the movement of poultry-industry products from
monitored ﬂocks (i.e., ﬂocks not known to be infected
with HPAIV) into commerce (Malladi et al., 2012), (3)
estimate important epidemiological parameters (Bouma
et  al., 2009) and (4) estimate mean time to detection
for HPAIV strains under different surveillance-detection
triggers (Weaver et al., 2012).
3.6. Priorities for quantitative research
In the USA, within-ﬂock transmission data are largely
limited to a few small-scale transmission studies. Thus, the
accuracy  of within-ﬂock transmission models cannot be
quantiﬁed, and our data-based understanding of transmis-
sion  dynamics (i.e., estimates of transmission derived from
outbreak  data) in different poultry sectors remains weak.
However, because the details of USA poultry-population
demography and structure are well-deﬁned, simulation
models can be used to understand how the structure of
different poultry sectors impacts transmission rates of
AIV  throughout different poultry sectors using situation-
speciﬁc details as inputs. Indeed, such dynamic models
(not  validated by outbreak data) speciﬁcally tailored to
the  USA situation have been used to improve our mech-
anistic understanding of within-ﬂock transmission from a
theoretical  standpoint (Malladi et al., 2012; Weaver et al.,
2012).  However, the tools used in these studies have been
underused relative to the number of pressing questions
that could be addressed. For example: (1) how does the Medicine 113 (2014) 376–397
type  of poultry sector impact within-ﬂock transmission
rates?; and (2) how does the type of surveillance data –
active  versus passive – impact estimates of infection of the
index  case?. In addition, as more within-ﬂock data become
available results from these simulation studies should be
validated.
4.  Transmission between poultry ﬂocks
Now we  summarize AIV-response decisions and quan-
titative data pertaining to transmission between different
poultry ﬂocks.
4.1.  Control policies
AIV  management goals at the between-ﬂock level
involve conducting epidemiological investigations, surveil-
lance,  depopulation, movement restrictions, biosecurity
and public awareness campaigns in a manner that
will identify at-risk premises and minimize between-
farm spread. Extensive trace-back and trace-forward
epidemiological investigations are conducted in which
the  movement of people, animals, equipment and other
materials between ﬂocks in the period leading up to the
detection of infection on premises are investigated. Thus,
a  key immediate decision is to deﬁne a maximum period
prior  to detection that should be considered for trace-back
and  trace-forward investigations. This decision is often
informed through estimation of the date of the initial case
using  daily mortality data, production data, current diag-
nostic  results (i.e., continued shed of virus versus antibody
only  persistence) and date of last negative ﬂock test. The
spatial  area surrounding infected premises where surveil-
lance  should be intensiﬁed during and following the event
is  usually unclear. Recent movements into the ﬂock (e.g.,
spiking  roosters), bird placement dates, and recent hand-
ling  of birds on the farm are the main considerations for
determining the spatial boundaries of surveillance. How-
ever,  these issues could be well-served by quantitative
models, especially in the ﬁrst few days when data are
limited.
An  equally important consideration is to identify the
temporal and spatial intensity at which surveillance should
be  conducted in epidemiologically linked premises and
how  the surveillance protocol should change on premises
that  are closed versus those that continue with business.
These surveillance protocols, which are implemented to
maintain  continuity of business during an outbreak, can
be  labor- and resource-intensive. Advance planning is used
to  determine how laboratories will leverage their critical
diagnostic resources and laboratory support (e.g., Secure
Egg  Supply Plan www.secureeggsupply.com) to manage
the signiﬁcant increase in incoming samples and urgent
need  for results. Parsimonious quantitative models that
rapidly  determine the cost-effectiveness for alternative
surveillance protocols would be valuable.4.2. Quantitative host population data
The vast majority of commercial poultry farms operate
as  all-in, all-out with no access to the outside environment
terinary
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Fig. 4A). The turnover rates for broilers and meat turkeys
re  about 5.5 and 2.8 times per year respectively (8.9 bil-
ion  sold to 1.6 billion inventory; 296 million sold to 107
illion  inventory; respectively) based on a census con-
ucted in 2007 (USDA, 2007). However, for caged-layer
perations, all-in all-out only applies to individual barns
which  are considered to be separate ﬂocks with multiple
arns on one layer complex), while for broilers, it refers
o  all birds on an operation (which comprise one whole
ock  divided amongst several barns). For table-egg layers,
ll  birds are the same age in 38.4% of farms, while 60.7%
ave birds of different ages in different barns and 0.9%
ave  birds of different ages in the same barn. Also, 7.2%
f  farms raise their own pullets, which is another potential
eans for poultry of different ages to be present on layer
arms  (USDA, 2011). Meat-type turkey operations may  be
ither  single-age premises (i.e., all-in, all-out) or multi-age
omplexes in which younger brooder birds are raised on
he  same premises as grow-out birds, ensuring that these
remises are almost never empty (USDA, 2011). For table-
gg  layers, the barns remain empty for an average of 17
ays  after poultry are removed (USDA, 2000). For trans-
ortation of birds off farms, nearly all broiler farms and
bout  80% of turkey farms use vehicles dedicated to the
ompany (USDA, 2011). However, roughly 90% of table-egg
arms  use vehicles that are also used by other companies
USDA, 2011).
Sources of new birds also differ between types of oper-
tions. Most (76.9%) table-egg farms received pullets that
ere  produced by multiplier ﬂocks owned by a primary
reeder company. In contrast, almost all broiler farms and
50%  of turkey farms receive chicks/poults from company-
wned multiplier farms.
The biosecurity of backyard ﬂocks contrasts sharply
ith that of commercial operations. A recent study in Col-
rado  found that 97% of backyard ﬂocks have access to the
utside  environment and birds in 35% of the ﬂocks are able
o  leave the property (Smith et al., 2012). The vast majority
f  backyard ﬂocks do not practice all-in, all-out manage-
ent, which allows for signiﬁcant bird movement to and
rom  these ﬂocks. Up to 46% of owners move birds off their
roperties annually, primarily to attend bird shows, sell
irds  at swap meets, auctions or ﬂea markets, take birds
o  slaughter or LBMs or move birds to/from other backyard
ocks (Smith et al., 2012), but there are little data on the
recise  rates and location of these movements.
.3. Quantitative AIV surveillance data
Data on the between-farm spread of AIV in the USA
s  challenging to obtain because: (1) these data are com-
ercially sensitive, (2) data collection during emergency
esponse efforts is usually not prioritized, and (3) surveil-
ance  and response are so effective that disease rarely
preads after detection. Nevertheless, 10 multi-ﬂock out-
reaks  of LPAIV have occurred since the 1920s, one of which
ncluded  evolution from a LPAIV strain to a HPAIV strain
Pennsylvania 1983; Halvorson, 2009). In total, these out-
reaks  have cost the industry $368 million, which does not
nclude  costs to consumers for increases in egg and poul-
ry  prices (Halvorson, 2009). One of the more recent and Medicine 113 (2014) 376–397 391
widespread multi-ﬂock LPAIV outbreaks, which occurred
in  Virginia in 2002, was especially well-documented and
included  data from a detailed epidemiological investiga-
tion (McQuiston et al., 2005). Initially, the H7N2 strain
was detected in a single commercial turkey-breeder ﬂock
and  the operation immediately depopulated. However, 4
additional  farms were conﬁrmed positive within a week of
initial  detection and 60 farms within a month. By the end of
the  outbreak, 197 total farms had been affected, including
facilities with both turkeys and chickens, and an estimated
cost  of $149 million (McQuiston et al., 2005).
An epidemiological investigation of the Virginia out-
break collected data from 151 infected farms and 199
control farms in an effort to identify risk factors of infec-
tion.  Some of the data recorded, which could be important
for  development of mechanistic models, were: farm loca-
tion,  date of reported infection, date of depopulation or
recovery, age of infected birds, number of birds, number of
poultry  barns, type of barns, worker activities, biosecurity
measures and presence of wild, livestock and peridomes-
tic host species. Although information on the origin and
destination of trafﬁc coming onto and leaving farms was
not  reported in the McQuiston et al. (2005) study, it was
documented by the USDA. There were also genetic analy-
ses  of the isolates collected during the outbreak (Spackman
et  al., 2003). Together, these data can be used to: (1) develop
a  parsimonious model that quantiﬁes rates and patterns
of  between-farm spread, (2) test predictions, quantify
uncertainty and validate crucial ﬂock-level simulation-
modeling tools such as the North American Animal Disease
Spread Model (NAADSM) (Harvey et al., 2007), InterSpread
Plus (Stevenson et al., 2013) or AusSpread (Garner and
Beckett, 2005), and (3) evaluate outbreak response strate-
gies  (Fig. 5).
4.4.  Quantitative experimental data
To our knowledge, there are no experimental data quan-
tifying rates and mechanisms of between-farm spread
using a model system, mainly because such an experi-
ment would be too costly and risky to conduct. The lack of
such  data underscores the importance of quantifying these
processes using naturally produced outbreak data and ver-
ifying  our understanding of the between-farm processes
that are currently described mathematically in highly-
parameterized simulation models.
4.5. Models
Between-farm transmission of agricultural animal dis-
eases  is an archetypical process for development of
quantitative methods in spatial infectious-disease dynam-
ics  (Schoenbaum and Terry Disney, 2003; Garner and
Beckett, 2005; Karsten et al., 2005a,b; Harvey et al., 2007;
Riley,  2007; Sharkey et al., 2008; Tildesley et al., 2008, 2010;
Stevenson  et al., 2013). Models of between-farm spread of
HPAIV  H7N7 in The Netherlands (Boender et al., 2007) and
HPAIV  H7N1 in Italy (Dorigatti et al., 2010) have quantiﬁed
spread rates and patterns using maximum likelihood esti-
mation,  and have determined control strategies that would
minimize spatial spread in future outbreaks by simulation.
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Fig. 5. Conceptual representations of two different approaches to modeling poultry disease outbreaks. (A) Bottom-up approach. Parameters from epidemi-
ological  investigations and other sources are input into a detailed simulation of routes of transmission. Within the simulation, a local area is represented by
the  dotted box. In this example, contact of an infectious premises (open circle) with a focal premises that becomes infected (open star) is via long distance
transmission  represented by the dotted line. Other types of contact and potential routes of transmission from the focal infected premises to susceptible
premises  (ﬁlled circles) may be by different routes represented by the black and gray solid lines. The detailed simulation output is often a spatial-temporal
prediction of outbreak dynamics. (B) Top-down approach. Spatial-temporal outbreak infection data are the input for model ﬁtting of a local spread model.
Some  features of the detailed simulation model, such as long distance transmission represented by the dotted line may be maintained. Other features such
as  speciﬁc, local transmission routes can be subsumed into a general, local transmission kernel represented by the shaded circle with highest transmission
risk  near the infectious premises and decreasing transmission risk with distance. This approach may  result in a simpler model that can more easily be ﬁt
outbreato  outbreak data. The output of a local spread model is often estimated 
between  initial infection and notiﬁcation.
Recently, progress has also been made in developing a the-
oretical  framework for estimating between-farm spread
of  AIV and identifying effective control strategies using
contact-tracing data, outbreak data and Bayesian inference
(Jewell and Roberts, 2012). Bayesian inference of an under-
lying  spatial transmission model has also been used to
show  that although backyard farms in Thailand were a key
element  of the successful propagation of the 2004–2005
wave of H5N1 infections, it is likely that improved biosecu-
rity  within the commercial farming sector was responsible
for  the subsequent overall reduction in transmissibility in
the  system.
For AIVs in the USA, disease-dynamic simulation models
have  been used to: (1) understand which epidemio-
logic parameters have large impacts on potential spread
of  HPAIV (Patyk et al., 2013), (2) estimate the conse-
quences of a potential incursion of HPAIV into the USA
(Patyk et al., 2013), and (3) estimate the time to detec-
tion on farms (Dorea et al., 2010). Flock-level simulation
models have been used to estimate the economic con-
sequences of HPAIV introductions in speciﬁc areas ask parameters, such as between-premises transmission rates or the time
well  as the cost-effectiveness of situation-speciﬁc alter-
native  control strategies (Patyk et al., 2013). This model
includes numerous empirically determined parameters
that describe details of poultry population demographics,
structure and movement between facilities, and has under-
gone  many tests to validate the model structure and to
measure output variation (due to stochasticity).
4.6. Priorities for quantitative research
Much of the previous and current quantitative research
on  the between-farm spread of AIV in the USA involves
ﬂock-based simulation models with numerous parame-
ters  (Harvey et al., 2007; Patyk et al., 2013; Fig. 5A). This
approach is valuable because it permits the examination
of outcomes under particular circumstances which may
be  important when preparing for unknown events that
could  occur anywhere in the country. That is, geographic
variation in the distribution of poultry facilities and how
these  facilities may  be connected varies widely across the
country  which means that transmission patterns occurring
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rom any particular introduction of AIV could depend on
here  the introduction occurs. Although, the detailed mod-
ls  mentioned above are constructed with ﬁeld-measured
arameters, their output is only as accurate as our a pri-
ri  assumptions about how the parameters are connected.
hus, an important priority is to assess the accuracy of these
odels  using data (i.e., how well these models predict real-
orld  outcomes). Complimentary decision-support tools
uch  as the development of simpler quantitative models
f  between-farm spread are also needed (e.g., Fig. 5B):
odels with large numbers of parameters inherently pro-
uce  output with higher uncertainty. Also, complex models
an  be computationally intense limiting their utility dur-
ng  an emergency when a reliable answer may  be needed
ithin hours (although the complex models listed above
re  intended for use in advance of an outbreak). In our
pinion, the data similar to those collected during the 2002
irginia  outbreak provide an opportunity for developing
impler models that: (1) may  produce results with reason-
ble  uncertainties, (2) estimate important quantities such
s  the time between infection and notiﬁcation or the radius
or  surveillance around infected premises, and (3) validate
utput of simulation models. This research is critical for
aining  a data-based understanding of the processes that
etermine AIV spread between poultry operations.
. Conclusion
We  discussed how dynamical models can be used to
nform AIV prevention and response policies in a large
ommercial poultry industry, using the USA as a case
tudy. We  identiﬁed the following important goals for
odeling research that can be accomplished with cur-
ent  data: (1) quantify the spatio-temporal relationship
etween wild hosts and poultry in terms of population
izes and AIV prevalence, (2) understand how the struc-
ure  of different poultry sectors impacts AIV transmission
ithin poultry ﬂocks, (3) quantify processes responsible for
IV  spread between poultry operations, and (4) validate
urrent policy-decision tools with data.
While the focus of this article has been on using cur-
ently available data for the development of quantitative
ools that serve animal and public health policy decisions,
ata resources for such tools are clearly limited and could
e  improved substantially with relatively limited addi-
ional  investment during key periods. Usually, when an
utbreak occurs, the situation is an emergency and data col-
ection  for the purpose of informing future (or even current)
uantitative analyses takes low priority. Although some
ata  are always collected, the types (and quality) of data
ary  by outbreak due to situation-speciﬁc circumstances.
ost outbreak data sets exclude simple pieces of infor-
ation that could greatly improve our ability to estimate
mportant control parameters. One way to enhance data
esources would be through standardization of data collec-
ion  during outbreaks. With the appropriate collaboration
f  expertise, including quantitative scientists, response
ersonnel and policymakers; the development of such an
utbreak-data collection policy could be achieved in a
ay  that minimizes risk of contamination during response,
aximizes cost-effectiveness and operational efﬁciency, Medicine 113 (2014) 376–397 393
and  includes data that are essential for improving quan-
titative tools. Such a policy could generate high-value data
resources  that would facilitate the development of accurate
response-oriented quantitative preparedness tools.
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